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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

20 MAY 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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20 May 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 20)

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

C O N T E N T S

Topics and Events Given Major Attention	i
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INDOCHINA

DRV Commentators Discuss Situation in Cambodia, Indochina	1
Cambodian Front Officials Report to Sihanouk on Situation	3
Delegates at 14 May Paris Session Stress "Escalation" of War	4
<u>Mao Tse-tung Supports Cambodian, Indochinese Struggles</u>	<u>5</u>
Peking Notes President's Remarks on Diplomatic Initiatives	7
Call for Socialist Unity Repeated by PRAVDA, CEMA Statement	7
European CP Conference Appeals for United Action	8
Eleven-nation Djakarta Conference on Cambodia Scored	9
Military Situation in South Vietnam	12
Ho Chi Minh's Eightieth Birth Anniversary Celebrated	13
DRV Council of Ministers Resolution on Grain Policy	15

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRAVDA Editorial Article Rebuts Chinese Polemical Attacks	17
---	----

CHINESE SATELLITE

Soviet Central Press Decries Motives Behind Chinese Launch	21
--	----

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PRC Cancels Warsaw Meeting, Cites U.S. Actions in Cambodia	23
--	----

SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

Soviet Articles Imply Broadened Role for Warsaw Pact	25
CEMA Session Carries Forward Moves Toward Integration	27
Ceausescu Visit to Moscow Reflects Rising Tensions	28

WEST GERMANY

Soviet, GDR Media Decry Brandt, SPD "Inconsistencies"	31
Bonn's "Blackmail" at WHO Meeting Seen as Bad Omen for Kassel	32

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Provincial Media Stress Need for Economic Self-Reliance	33
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CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS

20 MAY 1970

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 MAY 1970

Moscow (3832 items)

Indochina	(22%)	21%
[Cambodia	(19%)	15%
Lenin Centenary	(5%)	9%
Upcoming Supreme	(1%)	8%
Soviet Elections		
CEMA Summit	(--)	7%
Meeting		
VE Day	(27%)	6%
China	(5%)	5%
Warsaw Treaty	(0.1%)	5%
Anniversary		

Peking (3135 items)

Indochina	(83%)	55%
[Cambodia	(71%)	53%]
Domestic Issues	(11%)	24%
Lenin Centenary	(1%)	6%
Canton Foreign	(0.02%)	3%
Export Fair		
Mao's Statement on	(--)	3%
Dominican Republic,		
5th Anniversary		

Chinese statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Mao Tse-tung's voice is added to the expressions of support for Sihanouk's new "Royal Government of National Union" with the release of a statement on 20 May. Declaring that "revolution is the main trend in the world today," Mao expresses "warm support" for Sihanouk's "fighting spirit" and for the Indochinese summit conference declaration. Making no reference to aid, he repeats the standard Peking line that the Indochinese people, "strengthening their unity" and "persevering in a protracted people's war," will certainly win complete victory. The statement notes pointedly that 10 days after its establishment the Cambodian government has been recognized by "nearly 20 countries." Peking has not directly mentioned Soviet failure to extend recognition.

The assertion in the 4 May Soviet Government statement on Cambodia that the expansion of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina "makes even more pressing" the need for socialist unity is repeated in the 18 May PRAVDA editorial article, in the course of a comprehensive indictment of Chinese policies. Routine Soviet comment, like PRAVDA, continues to score the PRC for failing to join in "united action" in support of Indochina.

Brezhnev comments on the "aggravated" Southeast Asia situation in a message to an international front conference in Cairo "in support of the Laotian people's struggle." Noting that "the insolent intrusion" of U.S. and Saigon troops into Cambodia extended the "aggression" into all of Indochina, he states that "peace-loving and democratic forces" must rally their ranks closer to end the U.S. "criminal war." He also declares that the USSR is rendering the Indochinese people "all-round support and assistance."

A passage in DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's 18 May Hanoi speech commemorating Ho Chi Minh's birth anniversary could reflect concern over the continuing Sino-Soviet polemic. In a catalogue of Ho's virtues, Dong calls him the "clearest embodiment of proletarian internationalism," then quotes the passage in Ho's last will and testament on his pain at the present discord among fraternal parties and his certainty of eventual unity. In the first comment by a top DRV leader, Dong calls the U.S. "massive aggression" against Cambodia an "extremely impudent challenge." He reiterates the pledge of solidarity of the three Indochinese countries but does not mention that the DRV has recognized the new "Royal Government of National Union," noting only that "the Cambodian people" have warmly welcomed the setting up of leading organs of the FUNK and the new government.

DRV COMMENTATORS DISCUSS SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, INDOCHINA

In addition to battle reports of successes of the "Khmer liberation armed forces," DRV media in the past 10 days have carried articles by their military commentators assessing the situation and discussing

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 2 -

allied operations in some detail. The U.S.-South Vietnam objective of clearing out Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia continues to be generally ignored, although a commentary attributed to "Chien Binh" (combatant), broadcast by Hanoi radio on 10 May, does say that the Khmer people's property is being destroyed "under the pretext of looking for communist headquarters."

A 14 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article attributed to one Tran Phu, broadcast by Hanoi radio, calls the Cambodian operations "a repetition of the failure of the 'Junction City' military operation three years ago on a far larger scale." The article does not identify Junction City as a search-and-destroy operation, however. A 13 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by "Truc Chien" (hand-to-hand combat), broadcast by Hanoi the same day, says that "after only a few days" the allies admitted that their Cambodian operations were "unsuccessful," had achieved "only poor results," and "could not attain the set objectives." The article does not indicate what these objectives are, saying merely that the allied forces "cannot save the Lon Nol-Matak clique from danger."

Stating that the allied thrusts have been "on a 400-kilometer-long battlefield from the northeastern part to the southeastern part of Cambodia," the Truc Chien article goes into unusual detail regarding the operations: on 30 April 12,000 ARVN soldiers with U.S. support moved against the Parrot's Beak area of Svay Rieng Province; the Fishhook operation commenced on 2 May with 10,000 men from the 1st U.S. Air Cavalry Division, the 11th U.S. Armored Regiment, and units of the ARVN 5th Division; on the 5th, a third offensive was launched with 6,000 men of the U.S. 4th and ARVN 22d divisions, helilifted from Pleiku Province in South Vietnam into Ratanakiri Province; on the 6th, a fourth drive began with some 4,000 men mainly from the U.S. 25th Division attacking an area of Prey Veng-Kompong Cham provinces, and on the same day "two other offensives" were launched in the northern part of the Fishhook area; on the 9th, there were two new attacks by the U.S. 25th Division in the Parrot's Beak and Fishhook areas, as well as the launching of the allied naval expedition up the Mekong River.

Truc Chien asserts that the "patriotic Cambodian armed forces" have been activated and are "rapidly" developing in Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri, Kratie, Kompong Cham, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Takeo, Kampot, Siem Reap, and Battambang provinces. (Sihanouk's message to the armed forces on the 12th claimed that a large part of the population had been "freed from the control of the Lon Nol administration in 13 provinces, including Battambang.")

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 MAY 1970

- 3 -

Claiming that allied forces are being rebuffed throughout Indochina, Truc Chien cites "victories" achieved during April in South Vietnam and Laos, noting specifically the seizure on the 28th of Attopeu in lower Laos near the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. He calls this a reflection of the "close coordination" of the Lao-Khmer-Vietnamese struggles. An unsigned QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the same day also singles out the "liberation" of Attopeu by the "Lao armed forces and people" in reviewing the April "victories" in Indochina.

The Chien Binh commentary broadcast on the 10th discusses what the author calls "Nixon's five errors in Indochina"--the move into Cambodia, the reliance on a failing Vietnamization program, the 1969 attacks in the Plain of Jars area of Laos, the overthrow of Sihanouk, and "blind reliance" on the policy of using force to achieve a position of strength in Vietnam. Chien Binh claims that the United States has never been more isolated politically, with "all mankind," except for some U.S. "lackeys" in Thailand, South Korea, and South Vietnam, opposed to the moves.

BATTLE Vietnamese communist media continue to report "Khmer
REPORTS liberation armed forces" successes in Cambodia, with
 VNA and LPA recounting action in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng,
Kompong Speu, Kratie, Mondolkiri, and Kompong Cham provinces. VNA
claimed on the 17th that Khmer liberation forces were in "complete
control" of Stung Treng provincial capital,* and on the 19th VNA
reported the "liberation" of Siem Pang district capital in Stung
Treng Province.

A Liberation Radio commentary on 19 May, reviewing "two months of glorious victories of the Cambodian armed forces and people," takes brief note of the action around Kompong Cham city, but there is no reference to its changing hands. The commentary claims that the Cambodian liberation forces "annihilated more than 1,900 enemy troops" in action around Kompong Cham and Mimot.

CAMBODIAN FRONT OFFICIALS REPORT TO SIHANOUK ON SITUATION

The situation in Cambodia is also discussed in a 10 May message to Sihanouk by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim--the three individuals said to be in Cambodia as government ministers and officials of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). As released by Sihanouk's secretariat in Peking and disseminated by NCNA on the 18th, the message claims that "our armed forces" have to date "liberated

* Sihanouk in his 12 May message to the armed forces had claimed the "capture" of Stung Treng, as well as Kratie, Senmonorom, and Chhouk.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 MAY 1970

- 4 -

numerous towns and cities in the provinces of the northeast and south-east, northwest and southwest; the capital Phnom Penh is being menaced from all sides."

The message adds that the people in the "liberated" areas have elected FUNK committees and "organs of power at different levels and are ardently and enthusiastically making voluntary contributions both in manpower and materials to the great cause of national resistance." The three functionaries also express their thanks to Sihanouk for their election to the FUNK Central Committee's Political Bureau and the government and for "entrusting us to manage all the affairs of the country and mobilize our people to fight the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys."

DELEGATES AT 14 MAY PARIS SESSION STRESS "ESCALATION" OF WAR

The VNA account of the 66th session of the Paris talks on 14 May notes that the PRG and DRV delegations had postponed the 66th session, which should have been convened on the 6th, until the 14th in order to "protest against the repeated U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam" on 1, 2, 3, and 4 May.

VNA's account of the allied presentations says that GVN delegation head Pham Dang Lam "advanced absurd contentions and shamelessly slandered the DRV in an attempt to justify American-Saigon 'puppet troops' overt aggression against Cambodia." U.S. delegate Habib, according to VNA, "again tried to sell the so-called 'good will' of the Nixon Administration and to defend it "in face of the storm of public anger in the world and in the United States against its dragging out the aggressive war in South Vietnam, escalating the war in Laos, and overtly sending American and Saigon puppet troops to invade Cambodia, which have led to the expansion of the war to the whole of Indochina." VNA ignores Habib's references to the President's remarks on working for peace and says only that the U.S. delegate "brazenly slandered the Vietnamese people and threatened that the United States would take 'appropriate action,' meaning to further intensify and widen the aggressive war against the Indochinese peoples."

VNA reports that deputy head delegate of the PRG Dinh Ba Thi, speaking third, ridiculed the notion that the President's decision to send troops into Cambodia would assist the U.S. troop withdrawal program. It says Thi also refuted the "shopworn allegation" that a U.S. withdrawal would allow the massacre of millions of innocent civilians and charged that it is the United States and "its lackeys" who kill civilians.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 MAY 1970

- 5 -

Recalling that the NFLSV had put forth its 10-point solution on 8 May a year ago, Thi said that at his 8 May press conference the President had "once again opposed the legitimate demands of the Vietnamese people and uttered insolent threats."

DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, "analyzing Nixon's recent deeds in Indochina and his recent statements, especially in his 30 April speech and 8 May press conference, laid bare the bellicose nature, the obstinate and perfidious attitude" of the Nixon Administration, according to VNA. He charged that since it assumed office, the Nixon Administration has never really meant to peacefully settle the Vietnam problem but "has always nurtured the illusion of gaining a military victory and of negotiating from a position of strength."

Vy pointed out, the VNA account says, that the United States has committed itself "totally and unconditionally" to stopping the bombings of the DRV--a commitment which led to the convening of the Paris conference. Repeating the allegation that the recent May bombings of the DRV have "seriously jeopardized the work of the Paris conference," Vy said that "if the United States continued the bombings the DRV delegation would feel compelled to draw the necessary conclusions" and the United States "must bear full responsibility for the grave consequences" arising from its acts. (Although not reported by VNA, PRG delegate Thi also said the escalation of the war to Cambodia and the early May air attacks against the DRV "directly threaten" the Paris talks.)

The DRV delegate echoed Thi in rejecting the President's explanation of U.S. moves and said that "nobody sees any sign that Nixon is going to confine the invasion of U.S. and Saigon puppet troops" within his stated limits. Vy saw clear evidence of this in "the operation of over 100 warships with thousands of U.S. and Saigon troops on board sailing up the Mekong River to Phnom Penh and Kompong Cham on 11 and 12 May," the statements by Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky indicating that there should be no limitations to GVN troop operations in Cambodia, and the mobilization of the GVN navy with the participation of the Seventh Fleet for an "illegal blockade" of Cambodia.

MAO TSE-TUNG SUPPORTS CAMBODIAN, INDOCHINESE STRUGGLES

Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement on Cambodia and Indochinese developments seems designed to make propaganda capital of widespread opposition to recent U.S. military moves and to draw attention to standard Maoist doctrines on revolutionary struggle. While the statement is pegged to the "revolutionary armed struggle" in Indochina, it also expresses

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 6 -

the Chinese people's support for the current "revolutionary struggle" in America as well as struggles and national liberation movements worldwide.

Declaring cryptically that the danger of a new world war still exists, Mao's statement adds: "but revolution is the main trend of the world today." It goes on to repeat the characterization of U.S. imperialism as a paper tiger and to declare that "a weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big."

The passage on world war and revolution is a gloss on a Mao statement released in Lin Piao's report to the CCP Congress in April 1969. Lin quoted Mao as saying regarding the possibility of world war that there are "but two possibilities"--either a war will give rise to revolution or revolution will prevent war. The effect of Mao's present gloss on this doctrine is to underscore the efficacy of local protracted struggles and to play down the dangers of a larger conflagration.

Peking's motive for issuing the statement at this particular time is unclear, though the timing may be related to the fact that 20 May is the date on which a session of the Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw was scheduled to be held. An NCNA announcement the day before said the Warsaw meeting had been cancelled in protest against U.S. actions in Cambodia. Taken together, the cancellation and the release of the Mao statement seem calculated to underscore Peking's support for Sihanouk and other Indochinese forces and implicitly to accuse the Soviets of lagging behind by not recognizing Sihanouk's new government.

BACKGROUND The statement is the first to be issued by Mao since the 16 April 1968 statement that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King. Mao declared then that the assassination had shown black people that the philosophy of nonviolence is bankrupt, and he linked the Negro struggle to the worldwide one against American "imperialism." Mao had issued a statement on U.S. "racial discrimination" on 8 August 1963, and similar statements over the next year and a half dealt with the "people's struggles" in South Vietnam, Panama, the Congo (Leopoldville), and the Dominican Republic.

A 29 August 1963 statement expressing Chinese support for struggle in South Vietnam--which was pegged to Ngo Dinh Diem's "repressive measures" against Buddhists and others--included a reference to U.S. "violations" of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements and declared: "Apart from those who are deliberately deceiving the people or are utterly naive, no one will believe that a piece of paper called a treaty will make U.S. imperialism lay down its butcher's knife and become a Buddha at once, or behave a little better."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 7 -

PEKING NOTES PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

Available current Peking comment does not repeat the direct charge that the USSR is colluding with the United States in Indochina, but a measure of the effort to keep the notion alive is evident in a 13 May NCNA comment on the President's press conference of the 8th. Unlike Moscow and Hanoi, NCNA acknowledges the President's comments on diplomatic initiatives, quoting him as saying "we are exploring with the Soviet Union . . . , with Great Britain," and with participants in the 'conference of Asian countries' sponsored by the Indonesian fascist regime and 'through every possible channel' methods to see that the 'neutrality' of Cambodia and Laos is 'guaranteed.'" NCNA thus inserted ellipses where the President remarked that the explorations with the Soviet Union had met "with not too much success to date." NCNA routinely calls the President's comments on diplomacy "another counterrevolutionary tactic."

The 18 May CCP Central Committee message to the VWP Central Committee on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh's birth anniversary predicts that the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian peoples "will unite closely" in their struggle. And it adds: "whether U.S. imperialism continues to expand the war, use its accomplices or lackeys to serve its aims, or intervenes or conducts sabotage through the United Nations or any other international conference, it and its lackeys cannot save themselves from complete defeat."

CALL FOR SOCIALIST UNITY REPEATED BY PRAVDA, CEMA STATEMENT

Moscow's continued call for socialist unity in the face of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina is expressed authoritatively in the 18 May PRAVDA editorial article which replies to Chinese attacks on the Lenin centenary.* PRAVDA recalls the assertion in the 4 May Soviet Government statement that the expansion of U.S. aggression in Indochina "makes even more pressing the need for unity and greater cohesion" of the socialist, anti-imperialist, and peace-loving forces. The article adds that this position is shared by the "fraternal countries of socialism and the Marxist-Leninist parties of the whole world."

Delivering a broadside at Chinese policy in Asia, PRAVDA says that using Peking's logic "it would be better for the peoples struggling against imperialism to be isolated from the main

* The article is discussed as a whole in the Sino-Soviet relations section of this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 8 -

revolutionary force of our time and to be left face to face with a strong and cunning enemy." Charging that Peking thus demonstrates that it does not intend to take concerted action with the USSR and other socialist countries against the imperialists, the article sees the latest events in Indochina as added proof that Peking's stand "encourages the imperialists."

Routine comment in Moscow's Mandarin-language broadcasts on the eve of the editorial article's appearance continued the charges of the past few weeks that President Nixon's decision to "escalate" the Indochina war was related to the Chinese refusal to take united action on Vietnam.

CEMA STATEMENT A statement on Indochina adopted by the CEMA countries at their 12-14 May meeting in Warsaw, carried by TASS on the 14th, repeats the standard call for "closer cohesion of the socialist countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism." Like the 4 May Soviet Government statement, it says that all states that treasure peace and freedom "must show great responsibility for further developments of events and must show determination to help rebuff the aggressor." In decrying intensified U.S. aggression against Cambodia, Laos, and the DRV, the CEMA statement seems to go a step further than the Soviet Government statement when it warns that the spread of aggression in Indochina "not only aggravated the situation in Southeast Asia but also led to the worsening of the overall international situation and jeopardized the solution of many outstanding international problems." The Soviet statement said only that the U.S. intrusion in Cambodia "may result in further complication of the general international situation."

EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE APPEALS FOR UNITED ACTION

Increased support for the Indochinese peoples' struggle in the wake of U.S. "escalation" was discussed at the Paris meeting on 15 May of representatives of 18 communist parties of European capitalist countries. The conference issued a joint appeal and sent a letter of support to the VWP, NFLSV, NLHX, and FUNK. VNA carries the documents textually, and they are summarized by TASS.

The appeal declares that the parties participating in the conference "will contribute to the strengthening of the unity of action of the international communist movement, believing that the common action of all the communist and workers' parties will facilitate the victorious rallying of all anti-imperialist forces." It adds that in view of the urgent and serious situation, the parties call for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 9 -

"the strengthening of unity and for a more and more resolute and sustained action against the extension of the war, and for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina." The parties address themselves in particular to "workers and their organizations, socialist parties, Christians, and students."

The letter to the Indochinese parties and fronts reports the European parties' decision to further develop "political, moral, and material support" for the Indochinese struggle, to demand speedy, total, and unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal, and to increase pressure on the governments of the capitalist countries of Europe to condemn U.S. aggression. Days of action and solidarity will take place in Europe, it says, which will contribute to the "political isolation" of the Nixon Administration and back the antiwar movement in the United States itself.

ELEVEN-NATION DJAKARTA CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA SCORED

STATEMENT BY The 16-17 May Djakarta meeting of the foreign
SIHANOUK REGIME ministers of 11 Asian nations on the Cambodian
 situation prompts a statement on the 17th from
Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union" which "strongly"
condemns the gathering as "grave interference in Cambodian internal
affairs and a naked violation of Cambodian sovereignty." As
transmitted by NCNA, the statement says the composition of the
Djakarta conference reveals the meeting to be an undertaking
"inspired and maneuvered" by the United States, since four of the
participants are U.S. "lackeys" and the remainder are "closely
subordinated" to the United States.*

The statement declares that if the conference were "really" concerned with Cambodian independence and neutrality, the conferees "should in the first place condemn the United States and its lackeys for this open aggression against the sovereignty of a member state of the United Nations." The Cambodian problem, it adds, can be "easily settled" by the Cambodian people themselves after the immediate and complete withdrawal of U.S. and "lackey" troops from Cambodia. The statement also expressed thanks to countries which refused to participate in the conference and singles out Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan, and Nepal in this regard. It does not mention that the PRC and other Asian communist countries were also invited.

* The participants were Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and South Korea, with Cambodia attending as an observer.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 10 -

Although it was transmitted by NCNA some 12 hours after the Djakarta conference communique was released, the statement fails to acknowledge any of the substance of the communique.

PEKING Chinese reaction to the "sinister" Djakarta meeting comes on the 20th with an NCNA report and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. NCNA notes that the communique "pretentiously" calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and for the respect by all parties of Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity and denounces these statements as a "deliberate attempt to mislead the people and absolve U.S. imperialism from its crime of invasion of Cambodia." The PEOPLE'S DAILY article scornfully dismisses the conferees' call for respect for Cambodian independence as "downright ridiculous."

The NCNA dispatch also notes the communique's "clamor" for "a 'peaceful solution'" to the Cambodia question by convening an international conference and reactivating the ICC through consultations between a three-nation committee--Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia--and the 1954 Geneva conference co-chairmen, "etc." These appeals, NCNA says, are no more than attempts to raise the signboard of a "'peaceful solution'" in order "to serve U.S. imperialism in its aggression against Cambodia and the expansion of its aggressive war in Indochina." NCNA neglects to mention that the other mission of the three-nation committee is to contact the UN officials to seek UN action on Cambodia. But PEOPLE'S DAILY does note that the three-nation committee is "to link up" with the United Nations, which "everyone knows" is "manipulated by U.S. imperialism" and which has "no right to interfere in Cambodia's affairs." The Commentator article, unlike the earlier NCNA report, fails to cite the communique's call for an international conference and reactivation of the ICC.

Both the PEOPLE'S DAILY article and the NCNA dispatch shower abuse on the conference participants, particularly on Japan and Indonesia. The article calls the participants a "gang of vassals, accomplices, and puppets of U.S. imperialism." The dispatch adds that "some Asian countries boycotted and did not attend the conference," but NCNA does not name any countries and thus does not acknowledge that the PRC was among those invited.

HANOI AND FRONT A NHAN DAN commentary on the 20th, as summarized by VNA, says the conference "dared not lift a finger to condemn the U.S. aggression" in Cambodia and instead "took up the U.S. plans of using the United Nations and other international organizations and conferences to plead for the United States and legalize the aggressive acts of the United States and its henchmen."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 11 -

NHAN DAN thus suppresses the fact that the communique urged reactivation of the ICC. But it takes note of the communique's call for respect for Cambodia's sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity and for the withdrawal of "'foreign troops'" from Cambodia, "and so on," commenting that these statements cannot conceal the "dirty scheme of the U.S. aggressors." On the 19th a brief VNA report cites the communique's "dark scheme" of hoping to use the United Nations "to interfere in Cambodia so as to lend a hand to the Lon Nol-Matak clique in opposing the patriotic movement of the Khmer people." VNA mentions neither the communique's reference to an international conference nor its reference to reactivation of the ICC.

In advance of the meeting in Djakarta, DRV and PRG media carried a number of denunciatory press and radio commentaries, and both issued foreign ministry statements. The DRV statement, issued on the 14th, notes that "with the exception of a handful of lackeys and satellites of the United States," the Asian countries have refused to participate in the conference. "Obviously," the statement contends, the meeting is "intended to serve U.S. aggression in Cambodia." It says that "the Vietnamese people and DRV Government sternly condemn the so-called 'Asian Conference on Cambodia' and declare that all resolutions and recommendations adopted by it are illegal and null and void." The PRG statement, issued the next day, similarly declares any decision by the conference "null and void." It lists the participants, describing their political complexions and terming the meeting a "brazen intervention in the internal affairs of the Khmer people, and at the same time a step of preparation for deeper involvement by the U.S. satellites in the U.S. war of aggression against the Indochinese peoples."

MOSCOW The first Soviet acknowledgment of the substance of the conference communique comes in an 18 May English-language broadcast which says it contains a "hypocritical appeal for an immediate cease-fire in Cambodia." The broadcast also says that the communique advocates immediate reconvening of the 1954 Geneva conference--a step which is "untimely as long as Cambodia is occupied by American troops." This line is echoed in a Radio Peace and Progress commentary, broadcast in English on the same day, which adds that "an immediate cease-fire at a time when Cambodian resistance is growing against the American-Saigon troops would be advantageous only for Washington and the forces that support it in Phnom Penh."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 12 -

A dispatch by TASS Commentator Kharkov on the 18th acknowledges none of the substance of the "lengthy" communique but remarks that it "abounds in much too abstract calls which offer no effective measures in connection with the extremely grave situation in Cambodia." Kharkov claims that the communique amounts to an "encouragement of the U.S. aggressive actions" and that from it an American behind-the-scene presence in Djakarta is "rather easily discernible."

MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

There are scattered reports of current military activity throughout South Vietnam, with the focus on engagements in areas north of Saigon to the DMZ. PLAF military action in the Central Trung Bo area during the early April upsurge in fighting draws praise in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article of the 15th, which singles out the "repeated attacks" against Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh port. A NHAN DAN commentary of the 20th, carried the same day by Hanoi radio, praises the liberation forces' activity in the Nam Bo Delta area since early April in their emulation drive to commemorate Ho Chi Minh's 80th birth anniversary. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 18th also reports instances throughout the South of PLAF military achievements in the emulation drive.

The GVN's declaration of a cease-fire on 18 May to mark Buddha's birthday prompts no Vietnamese communist comment. The communists took no such initiative this year, although they had marked the anniversaries with cease-fires last year and in 1967. In 1968, in the wake of the Tet offensive, there was no cease-fire declaration by either side.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 May 1970

- 13 -

HO CHI MINH'S EIGHTIETH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED

NORTH VIETNAM The 80th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth on 19 May is marked by Hanoi with a meeting sponsored by the party, government, and Fatherland Front, editorials in the press, and the publication of a biography of Ho and a collection of his "important" speeches and articles. The meeting, held on the 18th, was attended by all the members of the party Politburo except Pham Hung and Hoang Van Hoan. (Hoan appeared as recently as 6 May at a V-E Day meeting.) President Ton Duc Thang delivered the inaugural speech at the meeting and Premier Pham Van Dong gave the main address.

In his broad-ranging address, carried by VNA on the 18th and 19th, Pham Van Dong lauds Ho as a successor to Lenin and Marx and enumerates his virtues as a person and a revolutionary. He also claims that "the revolutionary line and strategy of President Ho and our party are the development of the Marxist-Leninist theory, a worthy contribution to the treasure of experience of the world revolution."

Discussing the party's strategic line, Dong says that it is "first and foremost a strategy of offensive" but adds that it is also "a strategy of persistent, protracted, staunch, indomitable, and thorough struggle." This dual guideline has been similarly spelled out in other Vietnamese statements in the last several months, as has Dong's injunction that "we must apply the strategy of protracted fight to gain strength and win more and more victories as we fight." Dong adds that the strategy requires a struggle on three fronts--political, military, and diplomatic--"with emphasis to be laid on this or that front depending on the circumstances of time and place, driving the enemy more and more into a difficult and passive position, hence to repel him step by step, defeat him part by part, before winning total victory over him."

Pham Van Dong echoes periodic statements since Ho's death which have characterized the party leadership as "collective." He declares that "the collective leadership of our party at present comprises the disciples, comrades, and companions-in-arms of President Ho Chi Minh, who for dozens of years now have united and fought around him as one man"

In touching on North Vietnamese domestic achievements, Dong concentrates on the problems of management and organization--an area of concern which was similarly stressed by Le Duan in his 14 February article on the party's anniversary. The "most essential thing" for further achievements in the North, according

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 14 -

to Dong, is to "know how to manage and organize." He declares that "in the management of the national economy and the people's life, we must make fundamental and all-round calculations, which must have big and long-term strategic significance and at the same time must be very concrete and practical." He says that these calculations must be reflected in state plans--long-term as well as annual--and he notes that "to lead the struggle for the realization of a plan requires organizational capacities together with managerial capacities, which are very necessary to all of us, first of all to the responsible comrades in state organs." Hanoi propaganda routinely calls for efforts to fulfill the 1970 plan, but has not in recent months noted that the 1970 plan concludes a three-year plan begun in 1968. While other comment, like Pham Van Dong, has stressed the importance of long-range planning, the propaganda has not indicated whether a new plan for more than one year will be put into effect after 1970.

SOUTH VIETNAM Liberation Radio on 18 May reports that a joint PRG-NFLSV-Alliance meeting was held that day in a "liberated area" to mark Ho's birthday. Chief among those reported present was PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, who delivered the main address. Routinely pledging to step up the general offensive to defeat the United States and overthrow the GVN, Phat declares that the "South Vietnamese compatriots and combatants will express their profound remembrance of President Ho through an emulation movement for fulfilling all tasks set forth by the NFLSV and PRG for 1970, especially for this spring-summer, and through their unshakable determination to win complete victory."

Both LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) and Liberation Radio on 19 May carry a 17 May joint NFLSV-PRG message from Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat to DRV leaders "expressing the South Vietnamese people's gratitude to President Ho Chi Minh" on the occasion of his 80th birthday. The message, addressed to Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, praises Ho's contributions to the Vietnamese people's revolutionary cause. It routinely claims "unprecedented and all-round victories" since the spring of 1968, charges that the United States is "very obstinate, bellicose and tricky," and scores the Nixon Administration for its Vietnamization program, for escalation of the war in Laos, and for staging the coup against Sihanouk and invading Cambodia.

Additional attention to the anniversary includes a 12 May special communique, broadcast by the Front on the 13th, from the NFLSV Central Committee and the PRG. A message was sent from Vietnam Alliance chairman Trinh Dinh Thao, and LPA on the 18th carries an LPA memorial editorial on Ho.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 MAY 1970

- 15 -

PEKING NCNA and Peking radio on 18 May publicize the message from the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party commemorating Ho's 80th birth anniversary. The message eulogizes Ho as an "outstanding proletarian revolutionary" who dedicated "his whole life to the cause of national liberation of Vietnam and to the cause of communism." It notes that during China's "revolutionary civil war and war of resistance against Japan," Ho visited China "many times, shared weal and woe with the Chinese people and fought shoulder to shoulder with them." It says he "forged a profound militant friendship with the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people," and that he "made important contributions to the world proletariat."

NCNA on the 19th reports the "grand meeting" held in Hanoi the previous day to celebrate the anniversary and on the 18th it carries a version of the 12 May NFLSV-PRG special communique.

MOSCOW The Ho anniversary is noted in Moscow press and radio comment and marked by a meeting of the directorate of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society, but there was no official Soviet message. PRAVDA on the 19th, according to TASS, carries a detailed biography of Ho and comments that he was a "true internationalist and Leninist who regarded friendship with the Soviet people and their Communist Party as an earnest of success for the whole of the socialist community." The paper notes that Ho "enjoined the Vietnamese communists to continue his cause and make a worthy contribution toward strengthening and developing friendship and cooperation between socialist countries, toward strengthening the unity of the entire international communist and working class movement."

DRV COUNCIL OF MINISTERS RESOLUTION ON GRAIN POLICY

A resolution on the stabilization of grain distribution and the sale of grain to the state, reportedly issued at a 3 March plenary session of the Council of Ministers, is broadcast by Hanoi radio on 15 May. The broad goals of the new grain policy spelled out in the resolution are to boost grain production; to uphold the "self-sufficiency spirit" in solving grain problems--overcoming dependence on the state and imports and stimulating agricultural cooperatives to solve their own grain needs; "to correctly implement the principle of distribution to labor within cooperatives"--he who works eats; to strengthen state management of grain distribution through the country--including the elimination of waste, speculation, and theft from the state; and to strengthen and consolidate the worker-peasant alliance--an effort to stimulate the flow of industrial products to cooperatives and grain from the cooperatives to the workers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 16 -

As a basic measure to stabilize the sale of grain, the resolution stipulates that the state will fix the norm which the peasants must sell to the state based on the results of three harvest yields from 1963 through 1969--the most abundant, average, and poorest. This norm will not be raised for five years, from 1970 to 1974, and any increase in production will be retained by the cooperatives and the peasants, who will be free to dispose of it by developing husbandry or selling it to the state or to those short of grain.

The day after the broadcast of the resolution, Hanoi radio carries excerpts of a talk by Le Thanh Nghi, said to have been given at a "March conference of local officials," discussing implementation of the new policy. Observing that in the past the party and government have laid down many policies concerning food, Nghi goes on to discuss some of the weak points of the policy on collection and distribution of food "which appeared during the struggle against the war of destruction."* These shortcomings, according to Nghi, result in lessened enthusiasm for production and consciousness of the "duty to sell food to the state." He also says that there has been a tendency to rely on the state and that a free market in food has been observed. He explains that this situation has caused the state to experience difficulties in balancing food supply and demand.

* An article on grain management and distribution by To Duy, deputy director of the Department of Finance and Trade, which appeared in NHAN DAN in August 1968, noted that the Secretariat had passed Directive 149 in April 1968 on changing the direction of grain distribution during wartime, and Decision 179 in June 1968 on the task of unifying the management and distribution of grain within the state and agricultural cooperatives.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 17 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE REBUTS CHINESE POLEMICAL ATTACKS

A PRAVDA editorial article on 18 May--the first commentary on China on this authoritative level since 28 August 1969--presents Moscow's most comprehensive indictment of Chinese policies since the opening of the Peking talks and appears to negate any current prospects of a Sino-Soviet accommodation based on united action. The article is responsive to Peking's equally authoritative joint editorial attacking the Soviets on the Lenin centenary across a wide range of domestic and foreign issues. It ends a period of relative Soviet restraint on China, during which North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan spent three weeks traveling between Moscow and Peking as well as visiting Poland.* PRAVDA indicates that the Soviets see no hope that their dispute with the Chinese can be muted in the name of united action, citing "the latest events in Indochina" to renew the charge that Peking's rejection of joint action has encouraged "imperialist aggression." The burden of PRAVDA's attack is that Peking's policies are designed to further Chinese great-power aims at the expense of the communist and third-world forces as well as of the Chinese people's own well-being.

Almost as an afterword, the editorial article addresses itself to the Peking talks in an effort to stress Moscow's desire to keep the negotiations alive despite the bitter polemical exchange. The article repeats--without attribution--Brezhnev's remarks on China in his 14 April Kharkov speech in which he urged that ideological differences be contained on the party level and reiterated the Soviet interest in a border settlement. In renewing his warning that Chinese war preparations cannot pressure the Soviets, the article interjects a comment on the Chinese space satellite, charging that the launching has been used to foment "nationalistic passions" and for threats against the Soviet Union. The article concludes by quoting from Brezhnev's Lenin centennial address calling on the Chinese to come together with the Soviets in joint struggle.

* In contrast to DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's trips to Moscow and Peking last October, Le Duan's travels have not been accompanied by signs in the propaganda that the North Vietnamese have been able to play a mediatory role in Sino-Soviet relations. See the TRENDS of 29 October 1969, page 21, and 13 May 1970, page 16.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 18 -

Though in an earlier passage, cataloguing Peking's deviations in foreign policy, PRAVDA refers to Chinese territorial claims and to the border clashes, the article fails to imply any current difficulties along the border or to accuse the Chinese of recent provocations. The Chinese joint editorial had similarly avoided suggesting a deterioration of relations directly affecting the border confrontation. The current polemical exchange thus seems designed as another, major exercise in the ideological contest for authority in the communist movement, a contest the Chinese had promised in their pronouncements on the agreement to hold the talks last October.

The PRAVDA editorial article is largely a point-by-point response to charges pressed in the Chinese joint editorial. Points on which the two sides have joined issue in the latest polemical round include the following:

+ Introducing the term "Brezhnevism," the Chinese editorial had sharply assailed Brezhnev's leadership and personalized the ideological vendetta. PRAVDA returns the compliment with a bitter attack on Mao in a section damning "Maoism" as a "reactionary-utopian, petty bourgeois" doctrine. Judging from the PRAVDA article, the Soviets were taken aback by the Peking editorial's citation of a previously unpublished remark by Mao in 1956 charging that the Soviets had discarded Leninism.* Interpreting the disclosure of this remark as indicating Mao's personal role in initiating the current anti-Soviet attacks, PRAVDA contrasts the newly quoted remark with Mao's praise for Soviet policies when he was in Moscow in 1957. "An obvious fact of unscrupulous perfidy," PRAVDA intones.

+ The Peking editorial introduced the epithet "social militarism" in addition to the standard charges that the Soviets practice social fascism and social imperialism. PRAVDA replies by condemning Maoism as a Chinese version of "social chauvinism." On the score of militarism, PRAVDA draws on old polemical themes in attacking Mao for believing in "the inevitability and even desirability of war" and for being cynical about the effects of nuclear devastation. The article portrays China as undergoing militarization in all phases of life, though there is no attempt to depict Chinese war preparations as a threat to Soviet security.

* As quoted by Peking, he also said the Soviets had abandoned Stalinism, but PRAVDA chose to ignore this.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 19 -

+ The exchange has overtones of racism, with each side comparing the other to Hitler. The Chinese editorial evoked a specter of traditional pan-Slavic expansionism in denouncing the "new tsars" now occupying the Kremlin. PRAVDA retorts that the Chinese have revived Hitler's talk about the need to contain a Slavic threat. Each side has renewed charges that the other oppresses national minorities.

+ The Chinese editorial devoted a section to the "Brezhnev doctrine," condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia and denouncing Moscow's notion of a socialist community as "nothing but a synonym for a colonial empire." PRAVDA's rejoinder complains that Peking has spearheaded its foreign policy against the socialist community and has sought to undermine the Warsaw Pact and economic integration under CEMA. Unlike the PRAVDA editorial article last August, which discussed Peking's line on Czechoslovakia as well as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, the current article ignores the Czechoslovak question.

+ Peking's joint editorial dealt relatively briefly with the third world, accusing the Soviets of exploiting the underdeveloped countries and trying to suppress national liberation movements. In this connection it charged that the Soviets had helped reactionaries in such countries as Indonesia and India to massacre revolutionaries. The PRAVDA article, whose title calls the Chinese "pseudorevolutionaries," turns the charge back against Peking by laying blame on the PRC for the loss of tens of thousands of revolutionaries who allegedly followed its "adventuristic" line. In a pitch for broad support against Peking, PRAVDA rebukes the Chinese for promoting insurrection against "progressive" Asian regimes (an allusion to such regimes as Ne Win's in Burma), for provoking conflicts between states (bringing to mind, for example, the Indo-Pakistani conflict), and generally for seeking to isolate the national liberation movement from the Soviet bloc. In what may be read as a lecture to Indochinese elements being wooed by Peking, PRAVDA warns that to follow the Chinese line in opposition to the Soviets would leave "peoples struggling against imperialism" face to face with "a strong and cunning enemy." After citing current developments in Indochina, the article impugns Peking's motives as stemming from great-Han dreams of ruling "at least Asia, if not the whole world."

A TASS report on the 19th, rounding up world reaction to the PRAVDA editorial article, cites the New York TIMES on PRAVDA's criticism of Peking regarding Indochina. The TIMES article said PRAVDA was ambiguous on this matter, leaving it uncertain whether the Soviets were simply charging that Peking's past failures to cooperate on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 20 -

Vietnam encouraged Washington to send troops into Cambodia or were saying that Peking had currently rejected a Soviet call for united action. TASS does not resolve the ambiguity, though it quotes only the first interpretation and ignores a reference in the same passage to speculation that Hanoi may be seeking at the present time to put together a united front.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 21 -

CHINESE SATELLITE

SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS DECRIES MOTIVES BEHIND CHINESE LAUNCH

The 18 May PRAVDA editorial article's swipe at the anti-Soviet uses being made of the Chinese space satellite is the first direct, authoritative Soviet comment on any individual test in the PRC's nuclear-missile program. It caps a succession of Soviet propaganda items on the launch--a departure from Moscow's customary abstention from comment on past Chinese tests after briefly reporting them. The editorial article, a broadside at Mao and the policies of Chinese "pseudorevolutionaries," points to the "military psychosis" being fanned in the PRC and the Maoist regime's calls on the people to "prepare for war," then observes that "even the recent launching of a satellite as a result of the selfless efforts of Chinese scientists, engineers, and workers is being used to whip up nationalistic passions and for threats against our country."

The Soviet propaganda reaction to the 24 April satellite launch began two weeks after Moscow media tersely reported the event on the 25th. Beginning early in May, Moscow used the proxy of foreign press articles and foreign "observers" to impugn the Chinese leadership's motives and to play up the role of former U.S. Air Force Colonel Chien Hsueh-shen in making the PRC achievement possible. The first such item, in issue No. 19 of ZA RUBEZHOM signed to the press 6 May, was a reprint of a Paris INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE article on Chien's role in the development of the satellite. A Moscow radio commentary in Albanian on the 13th, noting Chinese propaganda efforts to ascribe the success to Mao Tse-tung's thought, cited "foreign observers" as stressing the "decisive role" in fact played by Chien, who "became a member of the CCP Central Committee" in May 1969. The major contribution of the American-trained Dr. Chien, along with that of West German suppliers and experts, is also emphasized in an article from the Indian weekly LINK reprinted in LITERARY GAZETTE on 13 May. The article estimates the cost of the Chinese nuclear-missile program as six billion dollars annually--a sum, LINK remarks, that could have been used to feed and educate the Chinese people.

While Moscow avoids coming directly to grips with the military and strategic implications of the launch, LITERARY GAZETTE's reprint of the Indian article includes a reference to the launch as a development which the world, and particularly China's neighbors, must view "primarily against the background of the almost explosive development rates of the military potential" of China--as an event

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 22 -

of basically "military significance." Moscow media did not report remarks made in Geneva by chief Soviet disarmament negotiator Roshchin, who was quoted by Harburg's DPA on 28 April as stating, in response to a question about the effect of the launch on armaments policy, that "this question needs detailed study" and that Chinese participation in disarmament and arms control is "one of the very grave pending problems" today.

Nor did Moscow publicize remarks by Soviet cosmonaut Leonov in an interview carried in the Tokyo YOMIURI on 13 May, contrived to project for Japanese readers an image of Soviet reasonableness vis-a-vis a self-isolated China acting against its own interests by refusing to join the international community. Leonov said it was the USSR's "impression" that the PRC is "wasting both money and energy by trying to do what we accomplished 10 years ago because China does not want to rely on the help of other nations."

Peking has itself avoided discussion of the implications of the launch in its own comment. In a diminishing volume of propaganda on the satellite, it has continued to publicize foreign messages of congratulations which in some instances hail the blow dealt to the "imperialists" and "Soviet revisionists."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 23 -

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PRC CANCELS WARSAW MEETING, CITES U.S. ACTIONS IN CAMBODIA

In an announcement similar in timing to its cancellation of the 135th session of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks scheduled for 20 February 1969, the PRC announced on 19 May (Peking time) that the 137th session scheduled for the 20th in Warsaw would not be held in view of U.S. military actions in Cambodia. On each occasion the announcement was released in Peking media early on the day before the date of the scheduled meeting. The February 1969 cancellation, announced in a statement by the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman, was attributed to "the current anti-China atmosphere" allegedly created by the United States in its handling of a Chinese diplomatic defector. The present brief announcement simply quotes the Chinese side at the Warsaw talks as having notified the U.S. side on 18 May that the PRC "deems it no longer suitable" to hold the meeting as scheduled "in view of the increasingly grave situation created by the U.S. Government, which has brazenly sent troops to invade Cambodia and expanded the war in Indochina." This was the charge lodged in the 4 May PRC Government statement reacting to the U.S. military incursion into Cambodia and air attacks on the DRV in early May.

The two cancellation announcements differ significantly in their implications for the near future of the talks. The February 1969 announcement took the occasion to denounce the "vicious features" of the Nixon Administration and to accuse it of following its predecessor in "making itself the enemy" of the Chinese. The announcement said nothing about rescheduling the meeting. Subsequent Chinese comment took a notably hard line on Sino-U.S. relations, in contrast to essentially noncommittal comment at the time of the Nixon Administration's inauguration. The 135th session of the Warsaw talks was not held until January 1970.

The current announcement avoids naming the Nixon Administration and does not refer to the state of Sino-U.S. relations. Also unlike the February 1969 announcement, it broaches the question of rescheduling the meeting, saying this will be decided upon "later" through consultation by liaison representatives of the two sides. The announcement thus manages to register protest against U.S. actions in Indochina, and implicitly to suggest a contrast between Peking's purity and Moscow's uninterrupted participation in the SALT sessions in Vienna, while indicating to both of the other sides in the triangular relationship that the Warsaw talks will continue.

CONFIDENTIAL .

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 24 -

MOSCOW In successive TASS dispatches on the 19th, one datelined
REPORTS Peking and the other Washington, Moscow was quick to
 point up the implication that Peking's move represents
 only a temporary postponement. The first dispatch simply quotes the
 NCNA announcement; the second one cites State Department spokesman
 McCloskey as saying the Chinese had served notice that a new date
 for the meeting would be discussed later and as having "implied that
 unofficial contacts with the Chinese side would be continued."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 25 -

SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

Romania's defiant response to Soviet efforts to tighten the reins on the European bloc through the Warsaw Pact and CEMA forms a pervasive undercurrent of articles surrounding the Pact's 15th anniversary, 14 May, and the 12-14 May CEMA Council session in Warsaw. The example of Czechoslovakia, where the Pact was invoked to "defend the gains of socialism," is a prominent motif of Soviet comment on the Pact anniversary. And the comment on both events appears against the backdrop of the recently concluded Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, which for the first time in such a document makes defense of "socialist gains" in each country a common internationalist duty and for the first time refers to "socialist economic integration" in CEMA.

Romania, whose renewed bilateral treaty with the Soviets was initialed two years ago but has yet to be signed, has made clear its rejection of both concepts. The Romanians declined to join the CEMA "international investment bank" established at the Warsaw session, and a deadline of 10 July for members to sign the agreement on the bank appears to anticipate continuing efforts to break down Romania's resistance. Romanian party chief Ceausescu's hurried trip to Moscow on 18-19 May, after the CEMA session and in the wake of a TASS announcement that the Warsaw defense ministers committee will meet in Sofia "in May," appears to signal a new round of intensified pressures on Bucharest.

Moscow's effort to emphasize Pact concerns in a wide geographical context adds another dimension to the tense state of relations. While authoritative Soviet comment mentions Indochina and the Middle East and evokes the Sino-Soviet situation in statements prefacing references to the Pact forces, authoritative Romanian articles insist that the Pact exists "only" as a defense against "imperialist attack in Europe" and emphasize that the Romanian armed forces are responsible solely to the Romanian party and state.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 26 -

SOVIET ARTICLES IMPLY BROADENED ROLE FOR WARSAW PACT

Soviet media made extensive use of the Warsaw Pact anniversary* to underscore, on the one hand, the role of the Pact as exemplified by the intervention in Czechoslovakia and, on the other hand, the "international" scope of Pact concerns. Both aspects are reflected in RED STAR's 13 May anniversary editorial, which hails the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty as exemplifying the principle of "defense of socialist achievements" and declares that U.S. "aggression" in Southeast Asia, Israeli "aggression," and the anti-Soviet campaign in China "demand from Soviet soldiers, as well as from our comrades-in-arms in the fraternal socialist countries, an increased vigilance and a constant readiness to defend socialist achievements selflessly." The editorial declares that "the American invasion of Cambodia compels the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries to do everything possible to repulse and to stop imperialist aggression"; and with an eye to the Sino-Soviet conflict, it goes on to stress the Pact members' determination "to insure the inviolability of their frontiers."

Pact Commander Yakubovskiy's anniversary article in PRAVDA on 14 May stresses in general terms that the Pact is "reliably defending the gains of socialism" and dwells on its members' loyalty to their "international mission." Yakubovskiy does not directly repeat Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko's reference in RED STAR in January to the "allocation" of individual countries' troops to the joint forces, rather referring generally to "diverse forms of military cooperation" including "regular meetings and conferences of the armies' leading personnel" and joint maneuvers. But Shtemenko brings up this sensitive issue again in a 14 May IZVESTIYA article, noting that "in the interests of collective defense the Warsaw Pact member states created the combined armed forces, consisting of national contingents which are assigned for joint operations."

* Radio Moscow's propaganda on the occasion amounted to almost five percent of its total comment in the week ending 17 May--more than double the volume devoted to the Pact's decennial anniversary in 1965. In addition to his article in PRAVDA on this year's anniversary, Pact Commander Yakubovskiy contributed articles to leading dailies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria; the then Pact Commander Grechko had marked the 1965 anniversary only with articles in PRAVDA and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 27 -

Yakubovskiy does call attention in PRAVDA to the presence of Soviet troops in certain Pact countries, stressing the "lasting combat friendship" between "the groups of Soviet forces and the personnel of the armies of the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia." In his article published in Prague's RUDE PRAVO and the Bratislava PRAVDA, also on the 14th, the Pact commander is more heavyhanded than in his Moscow PRAVDA article in declaring that "all that one army achieves becomes the joint property of all the allied armies."

CEMA SESSION CARRIES FORWARD MOVES TOWARD INTEGRATION

The CEMA Council session in the Polish capital, at the premier level, was called to implement the decisions on "economic and scientific-technical cooperation" taken by the 23d "special" CEMA Council meeting held in Moscow in April 1969, attended by party first secretaries as well as premiers of the member countries. The communique on the Warsaw session, carried by PAP on 14 May, goes beyond the April 1969 communique in calling for stepped-up "socialist economic integration" of the CEMA countries, where the earlier document had referred only to economic "cooperation." The replacement of the less sensitive term with the more blatant one follows the insertion of references to "socialist economic integration" under CEMA--in addition to customary references to "international socialist division of labor"--in the new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

INVESTMENT BANK In announcing implementation of the decision of last year's meeting on creation of an "international investment bank" under CEMA, the communique lists all the attending countries except Romania as having joined in the agreement on establishing the new entity. It adds that the subscribing countries "have agreed that they will have signed the agreement by 10 July 1970."

PAP reports TRYBUNA LUDU as revealing on 19 May that the "decision" on the new bank contains a statement to the effect that "all decisions to be made in the bank will not be adopted unanimously, but by a two-thirds majority of votes." The paper says this proviso will increase the bank's "efficiency" and will also be "a precedent, because the principle of unanimity, applied so far in all CEMA organizations, not infrequently hampered the activity of that organization." The new provision thus in effect serves notice that Soviet-sponsored decisions in CEMA will be imposed regardless of maverick attitudes like Romania's.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 28 -

The new bank's "main aim" is defined as the granting of credits for implementation of the international socialist division of labor as well as for development of individual countries' economies--an apparent indication that Czechoslovakia in particular must look to CEMA for aid in this form rather than in the kind of hard-currency loan it had sought from Moscow during the 1968 liberalization. The communique provides, at the same time, for continuation of CEMA's International Bank of Economic Cooperation, the vehicle for "settling multilateral accounts in transfer rubles," which had been established by a CEMA executive committee session in Moscow in December 1963 under the chairmanship of Romania's Birladeanu.

The communique reports another step in the integration process in the form of a new "institute of economic problems of the world socialist system," designed to "prepare complex elaborations of economic problems and to further deepen and improve the cooperation" of the CEMA member countries.

CEAUSESCU VISIT TO MOSCOW REFLECTS RISING TENSIONS

Romanian party chief Ceausescu's unheralded talks with the Soviet party leadership in Moscow on 18-19 May, at a time when serious flooding is occurring in Romania, underlines the strains in bilateral relations and appears to signal a new round of Soviet pressure on Romania to live up to its "obligations" as an ally. A brief TASS report on the Moscow talks on the 19th says that they passed in "an open and comradely atmosphere" and that there was "an exchange of views"--a euphemism for serious disagreement. TASS adds that the discussions covered the international situation, the world communist movement, and bilateral relations and that both sides reaffirmed their desire to "strengthen and develop friendly relations." Another brief TASS report on the 19th notes that the Romanian delegation--which included Niculescu-Mizil, the RCP's chief representative for international party affairs--was seen off at the airport by Brezhnev, Suslov, and Katushev.

Tension surrounding the talks had seemed reflected in Bucharest radio's gratuitous emphasis, in reporting the delegation's sudden departure for Moscow, on the unity of the people and party behind Ceausescu. Noting that the delegation was seen off by Maurer, Pana, and other leading party and state officials, the radio said many Bucharest citizens also went to the airport to demonstrate their affection for the leadership, "reasserting once again the close unity of the people around the RCP and their total adherence to its domestic and foreign policy."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 29 -

The hurried visit came against the background of evidently increasing Soviet displeasure with Romania's independent behavior. A major factor contributing to present tensions appears to be Romania's reluctance to abandon its neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute and, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, to support Soviet foreign policy positions. At a time when Moscow was seeking to preserve its options in Indochina by holding off on recognition of the Chinese-sponsored Sihanouk government-in-exile, Bucharest took the course followed by Belgrade in promptly recognizing the Sihanouk regime. Soviet displeasure over Romania's attitude toward the PRC is implied in the 18 May PRAVDA editorial article on China, which accuses Peking of trying to "undermine" the Soviet Union's relations with its Warsaw Pact allies and to "hinder plans for economic integration." In the light of Romania's refusal to participate in CEMA's international investment bank, the implication is that Romania is susceptible to such influences.

Soviet-Romanian differences on the role of the Warsaw Pact are prominent in propaganda on the Pact anniversary. In direct conflict with Soviet articles underscoring the Pact's "international" role, Romanian media used the anniversary to put pointed emphasis on its limitation to the European theater and to reiterate that Romania will retain control over its own armed forces. An article under the authoritative signature of I. Iliescu in SCINTEIA on 14 May, reported by AGERPRES, cites Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty which stipulates that the Pact will act "in case of an armed attack in Europe." Against the background of Moscow's deletion of the "in Europe" clause in bilateral pacts with its European allies, and in patent response to such statements as Yakubovskiy's--in the 14 May PRAVDA--that the Pact is a powerful factor for security in Europe "and other continents," Iliescu states flatly that the alliance's "only objective is defense against an imperialist attack in Europe."

Iliescu's article also responds to the implications of current Soviet articles in insisting that "the sole leader of our armed forces is the party, the State Council, the Supreme National Command; only they can give orders to our army, and only these can be carried out." Moscow has conveyed a picture of joint Warsaw Pact forces ready to serve anywhere needed in "defense of socialism." Thus Yakubovskiy, after condemning the U.S. actions in Cambodia, declares in the PRAVDA article: ". . . being aware of their loyalty to their international mission, the joint armed forces are determined to do everything in their power to discharge with credit their duties as a reliable shield of socialism."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 30 -

Iliescu's counter-emphasis on the control exercised exclusively by Romanian constitutional and party bodies over military actions recurs in other Romanian commentaries relating to the Pact anniversary. These commentaries echo the view of the function of the Pact and Romania's role in it that was spelled out by Ceausescu to a group of military cadres on 5 February, in remarks apparently responsive to Shtemenko's 24 January RED STAR article which referred to "combined" Warsaw Pact forces. Ceausescu made it clear in that speech that his country would not renounce party and state control over its own armed forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 31 -

WEST GERMANY

SOVIET, GDR MEDIA DECRY BRANDT, SPD "INCONSISTENCIES"

Soviet and East German media hammered at the "inconsistencies" between West German Chancellor Brandt's words and deeds as Soviet-FRG talks resumed in Moscow and on the eve of the scheduled 21 May summit meeting in Kassel between Brandt and GDR Premier Stoph. Commentators have continued to express skepticism about Bonn's readiness to make the concessions which Moscow and East Berlin say are essential if relations are to improve. Extensive Soviet and GDR comment evinces disappointment at the SPD's 17th party congress at Saarbruecken and Brandt's report to it.

Moscow has made no comment on the talks between Gromyko and FRG State Secretary Bahr that resumed 12 May. But a prompt, brief Soviet report on the reopening of the talks contrasted with Moscow's failure to even mention the first rounds in December, February, and March until their conclusion.

SPD CONGRESS Moscow comment for German listeners on the 11-14 May SPD congress stresses that Brandt's main address there "clearly exposed all the inconsistencies" in the policies of the government led by the SPD. Repeated demands that Bonn accept "reality" and agree to recognition of the GDR and Europe's postwar status quo suggest a concerted Moscow-East Berlin effort to confront the Brandt government with a tough, united bargaining position.

Typically, commentator Zholkver observes in daily reports on the congress that it brought to light growing dissatisfaction among SPD members and voters over the "open inconsistency of the SPD elite" and the FRG Government. This was revealed, Zholkver says, in the shelving, "under leadership pressure," of progressive foreign policy resolutions favoring recognition of the GDR and the Oder-Neisse frontier as well as in the SPD leadership's "unequivocally negative attitude" toward domestic reforms. At the same time, Zholkver says there was "no lack of praise" for FRG capitalism and monopolists and that Brandt delivered a "eulogy" on the "aggressive NATO pact."

A Zakharov commentary on the SPD congress, broadcast to Radio Moscow's German listeners on the 12th, offers a gloomy evaluation of the SPD's achievements to date under Brandt's slogans of "continuity" and "reform." Remarking that the SPD inherited from Kiesinger's CDU a state of "Russian character, intellectual decay, chauvinist nationalism, and anticommunism," Zakharov cautions that "reactionary forces" in the FRG are gaining strength much more rapidly than the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 32 -

"active democratic forces, especially within the SPD." He calls the Social Democrats' stand on the GDR an increasingly important indicator of whether they are in fact committed to "peace and social progress." And he concludes that SPD pursuit of continuity with CDU policies in the military field and in nonrecognition of the GDR and Europe's status quo "destroys the hopes" for renewal of the Bonn state and West German society.

In addition to its own negative reporting on the SPD congress, East Berlin's ADN publicizes a statement by the West German Communist Party (DKP) executive leveling a strong attack on the SPD and the Brandt regime. ADN quotes the DKP statement on 15 May as saying Brandt "again" ignored reality and made it clear "only a few days before the Kassel meeting" that the SPD leadership and the FRG Government "cannot be expected to make a contribution to a policy of peace and detente" based on international recognition of the GDR and Europe's postwar frontiers.

BONN'S "BLACKMAIL" AT WHO MEETING SEEN AS BAD OMEN FOR KASSEL

East German media are bitter and vituperative in discussing the FRG's role at Geneva in the World Health Organization's one-year postponement of a vote on GDR membership. ADN charges on the 14th that Bonn employed "transparent manipulations and blackmail" at Geneva because it feared the World Health Assembly would admit the GDR. A GDR Foreign Ministry statement on the 15th, carried by ADN, calls the FRG's "impudent presumption" of special prerogatives "indeed a bad omen" for the "proposed" summit talks. It adds that Bonn is "fatally wrong" if it believes it can apply the same "blackmail" policy in its talks with the GDR. The FRG's "antihumanitarian attitude" confirms anew that the FRG "has forfeited the right to talk about 'humanity' and 'human alleviations,'" as suggested by Brandt at Erfurt, the statement says.

A 16 May NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary on the WHO vote postponement points out that the FRG's delaying tactics were employed just a week before the "scheduled" Kassel meeting. The paper contrasts Brandt's Erfurt assurances about "exclusion of any discrimination" with the FRG's actions at Geneva, which it says revealed "an outburst of the greatest hostility toward the GDR, a brutal 'no' to equality, presumption to sole representation in WHO, and an act of scandalous discrimination in its most provocative form."

The Warsaw PAP's Bonn correspondent reports on the 18th that political circles in Bonn "seriously" considered the possibility of the Kassel summit being cancelled as a result of Bonn's "forcing through" the decision to postpone the WHO vote on GDR membership. Neither East German nor Soviet media have mentioned this possibility specifically.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 MAY 1970

- 33 -

P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

PROVINCIAL MEDIA STRESS NEED FOR ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE

Recent central and provincial radio reports point to a continuation of the Chinese leadership's drive to divide the country into semi-independent economic units with the county as the base. Numerous press reports applaud the success of local industry in using local resources to provide needed agricultural equipment, fertilizer, and processing plants.

SHANGHAI PROBLEMS A Shanghai radio commentary on 8 May, however, again raises the problem of coordination of economic efforts--a special problem for Shanghai, which depends on other areas for food and raw materials while sending most of its own output to other areas. The radio commentary includes the admonition that the "new form of socialist cooperation" involving extensive division of labor does not mean "splitting up the socialist economic entity into many unrelated departmental economies." It adds that trades and professions must be broken down, and the worker must not only think about his own factory or bureau but must take "the entire city of Shanghai and the whole country into consideration and firmly establish the idea of coordinating all the activities of the nation as in a chess game."

The "chess game" thesis had been advocated by former Shanghai chief Ko Ching-shih as a means of protecting Shanghai's raw materials supply during the Great Leap period. The radio commentary appears to amplify previous hints that the slogan is now also being used to explain to Shanghai residents why they must increase their efforts to support the rest of the country. The article criticizes "some people" who say that production capability is limited and warns against the idea that "cooperation must be reciprocal." Cooperation, it says, means "utterly devoting oneself" to the national good.

EXPERIMENT IN FUKIEN The economic transformation of less industrialized areas seems to be still in the experimental stage, but Foochow broadcasts on 7 May illustrated how it might be achieved along lines laid down in Mao's 7 May 1966 instruction. As in the few previous examples of relatively complete transformation of an area, the Foochow plan is based on the idea of making everyone a producer. The people of the area that was transformed, the largest township in Nanping municipality, were completely reorganized by the commune revolutionary committee: farmers were sent to the hills to develop forestry and crops, the old or disabled were put to work on subsidiary production, and "most" of the nonagricultural population was sent out to work in production teams.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 MAY 1970

- 34 -

A basic feature of the new plan, according to the broadcasts, is an increase in the size of the basic agricultural unit, an idea that has been tested extensively in neighboring Kiangsi with little apparent success. Production teams "cultivating large expanses of acreage but short of manpower" are grouped into units called "7 May villages" with cadres, township residents, and youth brought in to meet the manpower deficit. All those whose skills are needed in the countryside have been sent to the agricultural villages and brigades, as have handicraft workers dependent on agricultural supplies. One apparent reason why these radical measures are not being adopted more widely may be found in the modest results of this experiment so far. Grain production in the commune last year, even based on the possibly inflated figure claimed by the Foochow radio, was only 10 percent higher than in the previous year--a very ordinary increment by stated PRC standards.

CONFIDENTIAL